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Joy in Wrigleyville? The Mighty Cubs
Strike Out in Court
Steven J. Elie*

I

Introduction
On October 3, 1985, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down
its decision in The Chicago National League Ball Club v.
Thompson,1 holding constitutional a state nighttime noise pollution amendment to the Environmental Protection Act and a2
city ordinance prohibiting certain nighttime athletic contests.
The statute and the ordinance have the practical effect of
prohibiting the installation of lights and the playing of night
baseball games at Wrigley Field in Chicago, Illinois.3 Though it
was said that this case "will be of far greater interest to sports
fans than to legal scholars,"' 4 the implications and possible fu* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., State University of New York at Albany,
1984. This comment is dedicated to the Clones of Cardozo-a team that, like the Cubs,
has trouble winning playoff games.
1. 108 Ill. 2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985) [hereinafter Cubs v. Thompson].
2. Cubs v. Thompson, id. at 372, 483 N.E.2d at 1252.
3. There seemed to be no dispute about the effect of the law. The Cubs stated
repeatedly that the statute and the ordinance rendered the playing of night baseball
at Wrigley Field illegal. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at xi, xii, 4 & 6, Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985) [hereinafter Cubs Brief].
4. Chicago National League Ballclub v. Thompson, No. 84 CH-11384, Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order at 4, (Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois-Chancery Division Mar. 25, 1985) affd 108 Ill.2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985) [hereinafter
Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order]. This statement by Circuit Court Judge
Richard L. Curry was just a slight hint of what was to come later in the opinion. For
this case the Judge decided to use a "breezier, more informal style than is customary
in legal opinions." Id. The Judge used as headings lines from the following song
played during the seventh inning stretch at most baseball stadiums:
Take me out to the ballgame,
Take me out with the crowd.
[Buy me some peanuts and cracker jack,]
I don't care if I never get back.
[Cause it's root, root, root for the home team,]
If they don't win it's a shame.
For it's one, two, three strikes you're out!
At the old ballgame.
Id at 4, 11, 17, 27, 32, 39, 47 & 63.
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ture ramifications of the statute, the ordinance and the case itself may go beyond baseball.
Wrigley Field, located at 1060 West Addison Street in the
East Lakeview Section of Chicago's North Side, was constructed in 1914 at a cost of $250,000.5 The Cubs have played
their home games exclusively at Wrigley Field since 1926.6
Wrigley is the second oldest 7 and the second smallest 8 major

league ballpark in the United States. However, Wrigley has an
additional feature which makes it unique in the modern sports
world-it is the only major league baseball stadium without
lights.' It is this feature that prompted the current litigation.10
The Cubs are a Delaware Corporation owned by The Tribune
Company which purchased the team in 198111 from William
Wrigley.1 2 Philip K. Wrigley, William's father and the owner
from 1932 until his death in 1977,' s had repeatedly assured the
residents of the East Lakeview District that he would never put
lights in at Wrigley Field because he felt "the installation of
lights and night baseball games [would] have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood." 4 Philip K. Wrigley
5. Gapp, How Wrigley Field came to be the best of the ballparks, Chi. Tribune,
Oct. 3, 1984, § 5, at 1, col. 1. See also Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 363, 483 N.E.2d at
1248.
6. Brief for Defendant-Appellee Governor Thompson at 3, Cubs v. Thompson,
108 Ill.2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985) [hereinafter Thompson Brief]; Gapp, supra note
5, at 1, col. 1. Weegham Park, as it was called at that time, had a seating capacity of
14,000. It was renamed Cubs Park in 1918 when William Wrigley, Jr. became majority
stockholder of the Cubs and they began playing games there. Id. at 3, col. 1. In 1926,
the ballpark's name was changed from Cubs Park to Wrigley Field and the construction of the upper deck began. Id. at 3, cols. 1-2.
7. Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 4, at 5. Interestingly,
Comiskey Park, home of the American League's Chicago White Sox on Chicago's
South Side and the oldest major league baseball park in the country, was designed by
the same architect as Wrigley-Zachary Taylor Davis. Gapp supra note 5, at 3, col. 1.
8. Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 4, at 5. Fenway Park
in Boston is the smallest with a seating capacity around 34,000. While estimates as to
the total seating capacity of Wrigley vary, they are all around 37,000. Gapp, supra
note 5, at 3, col. 2.
9. Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 4, at 7.
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. See generally Tribune Co. Buying Cubs, Chi. Tribune, June 17, 1981, § 1, at 1,
col. 5. The Tribune Company also owns The Chicago Tribune (newspaper) and WGNTV and radio in Chicago. The purchase price was $20.5 million or approximately
$2,050 per share of stock. Id. at 25, col. 2.
12. Wrigley was the majority shareholder controlling 8,137 of the 10,000 shares.
He inherited the team in 1977 from his father, Philip K. Wrigley, who had succeeded
his father William Wrigley, Jr. upon his death in 1932. Id. at 25, col. 2.
13. Id.
14. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 176, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1968).
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went so far as to defend against a shareholder's derivative suit
which alleged that the Board of Directors' decision not to install lights at Wrigley Field adversely affected the revenues of
the corporation.15 Wrigley justified the decision not to put in
lights on the ground "that night games would
have a negative
16
impact on the surrounding neighborhood.'

But the sale of the Cubs to the Tribune Company posed a
new question-would the new owners attempt to install lights
and play night games?' 7 Such speculation, along with comments made by Dallas Green, the General Manager of the
Cubs, led to the enactment of the legislation challenged by the
lawsuit.'8

After the 1984 baseball season, the Commissioner of Major
League Baseball prompted the Cubs to file suit in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois seeking a declaratory judgment
that the 1982 amendment to the State Environmental Protection Act' 9 and the 1983 Chicago City ordinance 20 were unconsti15. Id.
16. Ravikoff, Social Repsonsibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent Man
Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 538 (1980). See also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d at
176, 237 N.E.2d at 778. The Court held that Wrigley, contrary to the allegations of the
complaint, could have been acting in the best interests of the corporation by not installing lights at Wrigley. The Court stated that a director could look at the effect
night games could have on the surrounding neighborhood. Furthermore, "the long
run interest of the corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field might demand
all efforts to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating." Id. at 180-81, 237 N.E.2d at
780. It is important to note that the Cubs never challenged the notion that night
games would have an adverse effect on the surrounding neighborhood. Brief for Defendant-Appellee City of Chicago at 17, Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 483 N.E.2d
1245 (1985).
17. A group of fans was formed with the acronym CUBS (Citizens United for
Baseball in the Sunshine) to try to prevent night baseball at Wrigley. See Keegan,
They want a 'yes'or 'no' on night games, Chi. Tribune, July 17, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
The group tried to get representatives of the Wrigley Family and the Tribune company to a meeting to hear their concerns. The Tribune Company declined at the time
because the sale had not been formally approved by the National League or the Cubs'
shareholders and they felt it was inappropriate to hold such discussions. Id. at 8, cols.
2-4.
18. Cubs sue: let there be lights at Wrigley, Chi. Tribune, Dec. 20, 1984, § 1, at 1,
col. 2. See also Markus, Green makes anotherpitch for lights, Chi. Tribune, May 20,
1983, § 4, at 1, col. 3. Green claimed that the Cubs could not compete with the other
teams in its division without lights, but he wanted to wait until the Cubs were legitimate contenders before bringing his case before the owners of the ballclub. Id. at 5,
col. 1.
19. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1025 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
20. Chicago, Ill. Municipal Code §§ 104.1-141.1 (July 27, 1983) (codified at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 901 (Supp. 1986)).
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tutional. 21 The Cubs asked that the Governor be enjoined from
enforcing the statutory amendment and that the City of Chicago be enjoined from enforcing the ordinance. 2 The Lake
View Citizen's Council (LVCC), a group consisting of organizations and individuals residing near Wrigley Field, was permitted to intervene as a defendant.23
After oral argument, both the Cubs and the LVCC moved for
judgment on the pleadings. On March 25, 1985, the circuit
court denied the Cubs' motion, holding, among other things,
the statute and the ordinance to be reasonable exercises of the
police power and thus constitutional. 24 The Cubs appealed to
the Illinois Appellate Court; subsequently, the Illinois Supreme
Court allowed motions by the City and the LVCC for direct
25
appeal.

II
The Statute and the Ordinance
In 1982, the Illinois legislature amended the state statute concerning the regulation of noise emmissions at organized sporting activities.26 This statute contains four classifications which,
taken together, effectively prohibit the Cubs from playing baseball at Wrigley Field after 10 p.m. 27 The noise generated by the
organ, the public address system and the crowd would violate
the Pollution Control Board regulations.28
21. Cubs sue: let there be lights at Wrigley, supra note 18, at 1, col. 1; Letter from
Peter Ueberroth, Commissioner of Baseball, to Andrew J. McKenna (Dec. 18, 1984).
22. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 362, 483 N.E.2d at 1247.
23. Id.
24. Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 4, at 30-35.
25. The Cubs filednotice with the Illinois Appellate Court that they would appeal
the ruling. See Unger, No lights, judge tells the Cubs, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 26, 1985, § 4,
at 1, col. 4. The Illinois Supreme Court will take a case where a notice of appeal has
been filed in the Appellate Court and where "the public interest requires prompt
adjudication by the Supreme Court." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 302(b) (SmithHurd Supp. 1986).
26. Baseball, football or soccer sporting events played during the nighttime
hours by professional athletes, in a city with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants,
in a stadium in which such nighttime events were not played prior to July 1,
1982, shall be subject to nighttime noise emission regulations promulgated by
the Illinois Pollution Control Board.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11 1/2, para. 1025 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). This amendment was
characterized as saying that "we should go back to where the law was before."
Thompson Brief, supra note 6, at 20 (quoting Transcript of House Debate, 82nd General Assembly, May 12, 1982, p. 61 (remarks of Representative Cullerton)).
27. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11 1/2, para. 1025 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
28. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 363, 483 N.E.2d at 1248. The statute draws a
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After Governor James R. Thompson signed the statute
amending the State Environmental Protection Act, the residents of East Lakeview felt they were safe from night games at
Wrigley Field.29 In the spring of 1983, however, Dallas Green
announced that he would seek corporate approval for installation of lights at Wrigley when the Cubs became contenders. °
The Pollution Control Board regulations only applied after 10
p.m. and Green felt the Cubs could begin and end games prior
to that time and still be within the letter of the law.3
Green's announcement did not go unheeded. On July 27,
1983, the City Council approved an ordinance amending the
Public Places of Amusement section of the Municipal Code of
32
Chicago.

III
The Legal Arguments
A.

Separation of Powers

The Cubs' first argument was that the statute and the ordinance violated the principle of separation of powers embodied
distinction between daytime and nighttime sports, between the population of cities,
between professional and nonprofessional sports and between stadia where nighttime
events were held prior to July 1, 1982 and those where they were not. The first three
classifications were all directed at the same theme-controlling nighttime noise. This
was based on the size of crowds, the size of a city and the time of day that sporting
events occurred. The fourth classification was "used to protect reliance interests and
settled expectations" from governmental interference. Thompson Brief, supra note 6,
at 24-25. See also, Markus supra note 18, at 5, col. 1. Dallas Green seemed to think
that the Cubs could get around the statute by finishing games before 10 p.m. Id.
29. See Markus, supra note 18, at 5, col. 1.
30. Id. at 1, col. 3. There was much skepticism that the Cubs, who had been losers
for so many years, could become contenders at any time in the near future. Such
skepticism was quickly dispelled when the Cubs made the playoffs in 1984. The Commissioner of Baseball modified the League Championship Series schedule for network television purposes and by doing so deprived the Cubs of the right to host some
home playoff games. Unger, No lights, judge tells the Cubs, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 26,
1985, § 4, at 1, col. 4, 7, col. 1. See also Cubs to pay for daylight-saving switch, Chi.
Tribune, Aug. 31, 1984, § 1 at 1 col. 3.
31. See Markus, supra note 18, at 5, col. 1.
32. The ordinance, like the statute, contains four classifications. The ordinance
draws a distinction between the hours stadia are in use, open air and enclosed stadia,
and their seating cpacity. These and the establishment of a 500 foot distance from the
nearest dwelling unit, all effectively prohibit night baseball at Wrigley, and, as a direct consequence, the installation of lights. The overall rationale of the ordinance was
similar to that of the statute-keep the volume of noise and glare of lights away from
the people who live close to a stadium. Id. Chicago Municipal Code §§ 104.1-141.1
(July 27, 1983) (codified at ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 901 (Supp. 1986)).
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in the Illinois Constitution by "declaring as law the conclusive
presumption that night baseball at Wrigley alone constitutes a
private nuisance. ' ' 33 The Cubs argued that this private nuisance
action had been adjudicated by the Illinois General Assembly
and the Chicago City Council and that the Cubs had been denied "every due process right accorded to a litigant even in
'34
small claims court.
While the court agreed that the remedy for a private nuisance lies with the "person or persons whose rights have been
disturbed, '3 5 it held that "[a] private nuisance ... that interferes with public rights can also constitute a public nuisance. "36
Therefore, the court ruled that the statute and the ordinance
were enacted to protect the public from a specific public nuisance and did not violate the separation of powers principle.
B.

Equal Protection

The Cubs argued next that the statute and the ordinance affected only one stadium, Wrigley Field, and therefore violated
the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 37 The Cubs contended that the enactments contained arbitrary classifications and imposed a burden on night baseball
at Wrigley but did not "subject other sports and entertainment
enterprises to the same restrictions."3 Furthermore, "[t]o be
constitutional, the Cubs argue[d], the enactments would have
to apply equally to all stadia in the state and not have exclusive
'39
application to Wrigley Field.
The court ruled that the equal protection clauses of the
United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution do not
require that legislative classifications apply uniformly.4 ° The
33. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 364, 483 N.E.2d at 1248.
34. Cubs Brief, 6up*'a note 3, at 31-32.
35. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
36. Id. The court relied on Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1,
21-22, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981) (chemical waste disposal site is both a public and a private
nuisance), and W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 88, at 572-73 (4th ed
1971). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 90, at 648 (5th ed.

1984).
37. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 366, 483 N.E.2d at 1249; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (1970); Cubs Brief, supra note 3, at 38-51.
38. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 366, 483 N.E. 2d at 1249; see also Cubs Brief,
supra note 3 at 47-48.
39. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 366, 483 N.E.2d at 1249; see also Cubs Brief,
supra note 3 at 49.
40. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 366, 483 N.E. 2d at 1249. The court cited City
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fact that the legislation might have affected other stadia but did
not "is not decisive on whether the legislation was intended to
apply to Wrigley Field only."41 The court also held any future
stadia would have to comply with the enactments.4 2 This holding undermined the Cubs' equal protection argument.
After defining a denial of equal protection as "an arbitrary
and invidious discrimination that results when government
withholds from a person or class of persons a right, benefit or
privilege without a reasonable basis for the governmental action, '4 3 the court set out to determine if the classifications in
the statute and the ordinance constituted such action.
44
The court held that since the Cubs are not of a suspect class

and the legislation does not infringe upon a fundamental
right,45 "the legislation, to be upheld as constitutional, must
simply bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest."46
The court then determined that each classification in the
statute and the ordinance was rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of protecting the property rights of
residents who live near stadia from the consequences of nightof New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding ordinance that prohibited
certain pushcart vendors from working in the French Quarter of New Orleans even
though it permitted vendors who had continually operated there for eight years to
continue working in the French Quarter) and Friedman & Rochester, Ltd. v. Walsh,
67 Ill. 2d 413, 367 N.E.2d 1325 (1977) (upholding legislation that made benefits paid
under a pension plan for a group of public employees immune from garnishment and
attachment when no such provision was made for private pensions). Id.
41. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 366-67, 483 N.E. 2d at 1249.
42. Id. at 367, 483 N.E.2d at 1249-50.
43. Id at 367, 483 N.E. 2d at 1250 (citing Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 477, 468
N.E.2d 1162 (1984) (medical malpractice plaintiffs are not denied equal protection because hospital reviews of a physician's performance are kept confidential but can be
obtained by physicians whose staff privileges have been revoked or limited)). See also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972); Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter,
82 Ill. 2d 116, 121, 412 N.E.2d 151, 153 (1980).
44. E.g., race (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)), alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)), and national origin (Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633, 646 (1948)). See also Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 Ill. 2d at 119-20,
412 N.E.2d at 152.
45. E.g., the right to travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)) and the
right to vote (Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)). See
also Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 Ill. 2d at 119-20, 412 N.E. 2d at 152.
46. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 368, 483 N.E. 2d at 1250 (citing San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) and Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 Ill. 2d 116, 119-20,
412 N.E.2d 151).
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time use of such stadia.47
Since all the classifications were reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose, the court found both enactments
valid under the state and federal equal protection clauses.48
C. Special Legislation
The main thrust of the Cubs' argument was that the statute
and the ordinance apply solely to Wrigley Field and therefore
violate the special legislation provision of the Illinois Consititution.49 The Cubs asserted that this legislation was aimed solely
at Wrigley and was intended to apply only to Wrigley. °
The Cubs' contended that the legislative history of the enactments, including the comments of certain legislators, proved
that they apply and were intended to apply solely to Wrigley
Field.51 The court held that this contention, whether true or
not, "does not have legislative relevance." 2 The court ruled
that where the language of legislation is clear and unambiguous
(and the Cubs did not contend that either enactment was unclear or ambiguous), "courts will give effect to the legislation
without resort to unnecessary means of statutory interpreta3
5
tion, such as comments by legislators. -

Despite its refutation of the Cubs' other arguments, the court
analyzed the special legislation issue. Since Illinois courts use
the same standard for a claim that the special legislation provision has been violated as they do in considering a claim of denial of equal protection, the court's analysis in the equal4
protection area was dispositive on this claim by the Cubs.5
47. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 369-72, 483 N.E. 2d at 1251-52.
48. Id. at 372, 483 N.E.2d at 1252. The court analyzed each classification by itself,
choosing to ignore the Cubs' argument that they should look at the effects of the
classifications taken together. See id. at 369-72, 483 N.E.2d at 1251-52; Cubs Brief,
supra note 3, at 47-48.
49. Cubs Brief, supra note 3 at 33-34. "The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general
law is or can be made applicable is a matter for judicial determination." ILL. CONST.
art. 4, § 13 (1970).
50. Cubs Brief, supra note 3, at 5-14, 34.
51. Id. at 6-7, 10-11.
52. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 366, 483 N.E.2d at 1249.
53. Id. (citing People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 341, 469 N.E.2d 200, 202 (1984)).
See also People v. Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141, 445 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (1983), and Franzese
v. Trinko, 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139, 361 N.E.2d 585, 586-87 (1977).
54. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 368, 483 N.E. 2d at 1250 (citing Illinois Hous.
Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 82 Ill. 2d 116, 123, 412 N.E.2d 151, 156 (1980)). The Cubs
insisted that the test for special legislation was different from and should be applied
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Moreover, having held that these enactments would apply to
future stadia, the court obviously did not believe that the legislation applied solely to Wrigley.55

IV
The Decision & Its Effects
In holding that "the Cubs have failed to meet the burden of
showing the unconstitutionality of the legislative actions," 56 the
Illinois Supreme Court called the Cubs out on strikes. Unless
the statute and the ordinance are repealed, lights can never be
installed at Wrigley Field. In the foreseeable future, the Cubs
will be forced to play baseball at Wrigley Field only in the daytime. They will, however, continue to explore other options,
including a new stadium in the Chicago suburbs.
If the Cubs become championship contenders, they will be
faced with the same situation they were in 1984 when they won
the National League East Division Championship and placed
themselves in the League Championship Series (LCS) with the
San Diego Padres. Because there were no lights at Wrigley, the
Commissioner of Baseball switched the LCS schedule so that
weekday games would be played at night in San Diego.'
The
Cubs lost the 'home-field advantage' in the LCS and, had they
won the LCS, the World Series.5 9
The alternative to switching the schedule around, deemed by
Cubs fans to be no option, is for the Cubs to play post-season
games at another stadium. In May 1986, it was announced that
if the Cubs were to play any post-season games, their home stadium would be Busch Stadium in St. Louis rather than Wrigley
over and above the test for equal protection. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 911, Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 357, 483 N.E. 2d at 1245 (1985) (citing Grace v.
Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478 (1972)). However, in Friedman & Rochester, Ltd. v. Walsh, the
court stated that special legislation violations will be "judged by the same standards
employed under the equal protection clause though the provisions are not duplicates."
67 Ill. 2d 413, 422, 367 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1977) (citations ommitted).
55. Cubs v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d at 367, 483 N.E.2d at 1249-50.
56. Id. 2d at 372, 483 N.E.2d at 1252.
57. See, e.g., Court rules no lightsfor Cubs, Chi. Tribune, Oct. 4, 1985, § 1, at 1, col.
2.
58. See, e.g., Cubs to pay for daylight saving-switch supra note 30, at 1, col. 4-5.
59. Id. at 1, col. 3; Cubs Brief, supra note 3, at 2. Both series' are best-of-seven
series. In even years the National League East Champion generally has the home
advantage (4 home games) in the LCS and the winner of the National League LCS
has the home advantage in the World Series. Major League Rule 37, BASEBALL BLUEBOOK (1986).
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Field.6 °
After the 1984 season, Peter Ueberroth, the new Commissioner of Baseball, informed the Cubs of the need to solve the
problem of the lack of lighting at Wrigley Field on a long term
basis.6 1 The Cubs attempted to resolve the problem with this
lawsuit. Since the Cubs lost the lawsuit and are seriously exploring the option of a new stadium, there is now growing concern by some of Wrigley Field's neighbors that the Cubs may
leave Wrigley Field and the East Lakeview area and take many
jobs with them. 62 Even the president of Citizen United for
Baseball in the Sunshine (CUBS), which publicly opposed the
Cubs' efforts in court, supports night games for the playoffs and
the World Series as a compromise to keep the Cubs in Chicago.63 To date, there appears to be no further action by the
Legislature or the Cubs in this regard.
It is true that future stadia in Chicago will have to comply
with the statute and the ordinance. It seems clear, however,
that no modern sports stadium would be built or approved in an
urban setting such as that in which Wrigley is situated.64
There is more to this case, however, than a prohibition of
night baseball at Wrigley Field. This case exemplifies a lesson
in constituency politics. How many politicians would oppose a
person's right to enjoy a quiet night in his or her own home?
Obviously, very few in the Illinois General Assembly and even
fewer on the Chicago City Council would oppose such a right.
60. See Newhan, The light is dawning over Wrigley Field, L.A. Times, May 25,
1986, § 3, at 4, col. 1.
61. Cubs Brief, supra note 3, at 2. On December 18, 1984, one day before the lawsuit was filed, Ueberroth sent a letter to Andy McKenna, Chairman of the Board of
the Cubs, outlining baseball's concerns regarding lights at Wrigley. This letter
prompted some scolding from the trial court judge who stated "[tihe game of a (sic)
baseball may be 'everbody's business' but the business of baseball is greed." Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 5, at 62.
62. See Terry, New group goes to batfor Wrigley Field lights, Chi. Tribune, Sept.
3, 1985, § 2 at 6, col. 1. Many a fan's opinion was eloquently represented by Gladys
Nunley, age 62, who first saw the Cubs play in 1927: "I have seen the Cubs play in
every National League ballpark that exists and some that no longer exist ... I want
lights because I don't want to see the Cubs leave Chicago." (Mrs. Nunley lives seven
blocks from the ballpark). Id. at 6, col. 2. On the other hand, many fans felt that the
only time baseball should be played is in the daytime. These 'baseball purists' were
among those opposing the installation of lights at any time.
63. See Court rules no lights for Cubs, supra note 57, at 24, col. 2.
64. Aside from the fact that the neighbors to such a stadium would protest vehemently, Fenway Park in Boston is the only other stadium in the country that is so
close to houses and Fenway Park was built before 1940. Furthermore, stadia today
are generally built with easy access to highways for easier ballpark ingress and egress.
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This was one instance where the legislators could not lose by
voting for a proposal. A 'yes' vote meant they were in favor of
preserving the character of neighborhoods. This was a great
way to impress their constituents by showing support for the
preservation of Wrigleyville and, consequently, their own district. A 'no' vote, however, meant they were giving in to the
'greedy' Cubs and the owners of the other major league baseball teams- "twenty-five distant sports moguls."65
No legislator likes to be seen as giving in to moneyed interests. To make matters worse, the Cubs were not in favor with
the most powerful politicians in the state and the city. 66 In fact

there seemed to be some animosity between the Chicago Tribune and Alderman Edward Vrdolyak, the leader of the City
Council majority.67 Ultimately, the situation became a contest
between a large constituency with political backing and a corporation with no vocal constituency or real political clout. The
outcome was eminently predictable.

V
Conclusion
The Cubs took their home run swing and struck out. Maybe,
as was suggested, the Cubs "should have had a better scouting
report before [going] to court, '6' and perhaps "[jiustice is a
Southpaw and the Cubs just don't hit lefties!!!" 69 Nevertheless,
it seems that the contest was lost long before the Cubs got to
the ballpark.
A close reading of the legislative history would show, as the
65. Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 5, at 62. The trial court
judge characterized this lawsuit as a "scheme which has major league baseball trashing a residential community and tinkering with the quality-of-life aspirations of
countless households so that television royalties might more easily flow into the coffers" of the owners. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Curry found this scheme "repugnant to common decency." Id.
66. Chi. Tribune, July 3, 1985, § 1, at 22, cols. 1-2. This editorial asserts that nothing is passed in the General Assembly without the approval of Michal Madigan, the
Speaker of the House. The same seems to be true of Alderman Edward Vrdolyak in
the City Council. The editorial also asserts that the Cubs would have to make a deal
with Madigan before getting anything they want, and that no deal would be possible
with Vrdolyak. Id.
67. Id. The editorial states that Vrdolyak "won't do anything for the Cubs because of The Tribune's editorial policy toward him, which might best be described as
negative." Id at col. 2. Note that the Cubs and the Tribune are owned by the same
corporation. Id. at col. 1; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
68. Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 5, at 63.
69. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Cubs tried to point out, that the members of the General Assembly and the Aldermen of the Chicago City Council were
only concerned with prohibiting night games at Wrigley Field.
While this does not have "legislative relevance" because the
language of the statute and the ordinance is clear and unambiguous, persons untrained in legalese might say: "The Cubs was
robbed."70
Everyone in Chicago knew why the statute and the ordinance
were passed. One of the sponsoring legislators even called the
statute the "No-Lights Law."'" The legislators and their bill
drafters are trained in legalese 72 and knew how to word the
statute and the ordinance carefully to avoid any equal protection or special legislation argument. Thus, from a purely legal
perspective, the court's decision was defensible. Both laws
were drafted so Wrigley Field would not be mentioned specifically and the nebulous concept of future stadia would be covered by the enactments.7 Ultimately, the Cubs did not have
the clout to stop the legislation. They fell prey to a game of
politics in which they were not even allowed a turn at bat.
True, the Cubs have lost this ballgame. But the real losers in
this litigation will be the fans. Soon, maybe not this year or
next, but soon enough, the economic costs of playing in a small
stadium without lights for night games will cause the Cubs to
build one of those "drab, boringly symmetrical and sometimes
domed multipurpose parks surrounded by vast acreages devoted to auto parking.

'74

The Cubs will abandon "beautiful

' 75

Wrigley Field,
one of the "most beautiful place[s] in the nation to watch baseball. '76 That, sports fans, is a shame.

70. Taken from the old fans' saying "we was robbed" when a bad call by an umpire has cost their team the ballgame.
71. Cubs Brief, supra note 3, at 6.
72. The trial court judge even commented that lawyers and judges speak in
legalese. Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 5, at 3-4. Quoting
from Jonathan Swift of Gulliver's Travels he stated that "[j]udges and lawyers have 'a
jargon of their own that no other mortal can understand.'" Id. at 3, n.1.
73. No stadium has been built in Chicago for over 50 years and all plans for future
stadia in the area have discussed sites outside of Chicago. Cubs Brief, supra note 3, at

26.
74, Gapp, supra note 5, at 3, col. 3.
75. Memorandum Opinion & Judgment Order, supra note 5, at 4.
76.

Gapp, supra note 5; at 3, col. 3.
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